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RESCUING THE HERO: THE RAMIFICATIONS
OF EXPANDING THE DUTY TO RESCUE ON
SOCIETY AND THE LAW
AMELIA H. ASHTON†
ABSTRACT
The ongoing debate about the legal duty to rescue another person
in peril is fraught with a familiar tension. On one side stands the
traditional and distinctly American determination that freedom from
such a duty is essential, that the technical rules of tort law and selfpreservation instincts disdain such a requirement, and that the
postulates of religion and morality are sure to fill in any legal gaps.
On the other, a more recent humanitarian perspective—seen in
revisions to the Restatement, case law, and some state statutes—
advocates for requiring easy rescue, positing that religiously inspired
morality and public good-doing are unlikely, and citing highly
publicized incidents in which bystanders remained callously, though
lawfully, inactive.
But the classic dialogue between an autonomist’s protection of the
rescuer and the humanitarian protection of the rescuee has thus far
neglected a thorough treatment of a figure viscerally affected by the
slow erosion of the historical no-duty rule: the hero. The hero derives
his meaning by acting in ways that are not legally required; in other
words, the hero is valuable because he acts not as the law’s
“reasonable man,” but as a figure wholly outside of it. This Note
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argues that as the duty to rescue expands, the moral realm in which
the hero acts consequently shrinks, and that the values a hero inspires
in society—hope, exemplary conduct, public celebration, societal
reflection, and spiritual absolution—are likely to suffer as well. In
this way, increasing the duty to rescue not only affects society but also
runs the risk of confusing the law by deeming potentially heroic
action reasonable. This dual distortion of social and legal values
merits a new and invigorated examination of the role of the hero as a
real and meaningful concept—a concept that risks danger should the
duty to rescue continue to expand.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine the law as a line that separates legal requirement from
moral choice on a continuum that embodies all acts of rescue. The
first space on the continuum is a realm of “legal duty,” wherein
certain behavior is required by law. The second space, residing on the
other side of the line, is a realm of “no legal duty,” wherein acts are
evaluated according to moral norms and social aspirations. This
second space is also the realm of a little-discussed figure in American
1
duty to rescue law: the hero. If heroes are heroes because of their
decisions to act in ways that set them apart, then a society that
demands action through law redefines the notion of who is a hero
and, correspondingly, the nature of heroic acts. Because the law
typically provides that ordinary actions—what the average person
does or would do—are the essence of reasonableness, the legal
boundary simultaneously defines the reasonable person. Necessarily,
the creation of new legal duties to rescue increases the size of the
1. Several articles have considered the repercussions to altruism or heroes and then
quickly discarded the notion. See John M. Adler, Relying upon the Reasonableness of Strangers:
Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or
Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867, 918 (recognizing and briefly refuting “the
argument . . . that where altruism is required, it loses its moral value to society”); Marin Roger
Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82
TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1469, 1474 (2008) (noting that a duty to rescue would create a “discount of
altruism,” which would mean that “altruistic, praiseworthy behavior will be transformed and
diminished to not much more than ordinary obedience of the law and compliance with the
minimum social expectation that is articulated by that law” as one in a list of “costs of a coercive
rule”); Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV.
423, 434 (1985) (“A final concern is that a rescue duty would deprive society of clear examples
of heroic conduct by making it uncertain whether rescue had been occasioned by altruistic
impulses or by fear of legal sanctions. However, any rescue law would almost certainly
provide . . . that a would-be rescuer need not imperil his own life. As such, there would be ample
opportunity for heroism.”).
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legal space on the continuum and thus decreases what remains—the
moral space—by leaving citizens a moral choice to take action in
2
fewer instances. As a result, shifting the location of the line of the law
along the continuum of rescue acts either increases or decreases the
number of instances in which individual actions can be characterized
as heroic or merely as the right thing to do, as required by the law.
Anglo-American law proscribes an extremely narrow set of legal
duties, leaving a large moral realm in which a citizen may choose to
3
act heroically or simply to be an uninvolved bystander. This holds
true for a broad range of scenarios. On one end of the spectrum of
4
rescue acts exist cases of “easy rescue,” in which an onlooker could
act without incurring harm to himself or others, such as by picking up
5
a baby in the path of an oncoming train. On the other end, situations
of more difficult or “expensive” rescue arise, with risks that could cost
the would-be rescuers loss of property or tangible opportunity,
6
infliction of serious bodily injury, and even their lives. The decision
to construct the space of legally required rescue so narrowly has been
7
the subject of much debate in both the legal academic literature and
8
in policy circles. This decision has historically been defended on two
main grounds: that legally required rescue infringes upon a distinctly
American sense of individual liberty, and that it flies in the face of

2. See A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L.
REV. 1273, 1273 (1983) (“The area of so-called Good Samaritan law . . . is one in which the
relationship between morality and law is particularly sensitive.”).
3. See infra Part I.
4. Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 750
(1994) (suggesting that hypothetically “courts might recognize a limited duty to rescue that
would be enforceable only in tort law, and that would apply only to cases of ‘easy rescue,’ in
which one individual is able to rescue another with little or no risk or expense to herself or
others”).
5. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
6. See Heyman, supra note 4, at 750 (“[E]asy rescues involve no significant risk of injury
or expenditure of resources that would require public compensation to the rescuer or others.”).
7. E.g., Silver, supra note 1, at 423; Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90
YALE L.J. 247, 258–68 (1980); Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to
Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 13–23 (1993).
8. This debate has led several states to enact statutes establishing an affirmative duty to
rescue or otherwise aid. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2002) (establishing a duty to
report certain heinous crimes); MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1 (2008) (establishing a duty to
provide “reasonable assistance”); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-3.1 to -3.4 (2002) (establishing an
affirmative duty to report a rape that occurred in one’s presence); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519
(2002) (establishing a duty to provide “reasonable assistance”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West
2005) (establishing a duty to aid); see also Silver, supra note 1, at 427 (describing legislative
enactments of duties to aid in various states); infra Part II.
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9

natural law instincts of self-preservation. The law generally cherishes
the choice not to rescue, even in the least risky of cases. The result is
a moral sphere left wide open to the possibility of heroes.
Relatively recently, however, the law has been characterized by
small but steady attempts to shrink that sphere by increasing legal
10
duties to rescue. The movement has been justified by humanitarian
concerns and a utilitarian perspective that champions the important
and palpable benefit of saving a life in easy rescue cases—that is,
cases containing no tangible risk to the would-be rescuer and, it is
11
argued, a comparably insignificant loss of personal liberty. States
12
have steadily chipped away at the no-duty realm through case law
13
and Good Samaritan statutes, which legally require action in these
scenarios. The shift reflects an increasingly strong norm that rescue
14
acts that would have little risk should be required by law.
Even given this trend, evidence of an ongoing debate about the
duty to rescue remains. Legislatures have required further duties only
15
incrementally, and Good Samaritan statutes have rarely, if ever,
16
17
18
been enforced. Despite the academic and sometimes even societal
call for reform, the common law tradition of narrow duties seems to
9. See infra Part I.
10. See supra note 8; infra Part II.
11. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 7, at 272 (“It . . . seems that the imposition of a duty to
effect an easy rescue in an emergency would form a coherent part of a growing pattern in those
doctrines that most fully embody the common law’s notion of individual liberty.” (citation
omitted)); see also Robert Justin Lipkin, Comment, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral
Monsters: An Individualistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV.
252, 291 (1983) (“A person should accept the principle of easy rescue because it enhances his
liberty.”).
12. The Restatement codified these trends by identifying four circumstances in which a
duty to rescue was owed: the duties of a common carrier to its passengers, an innkeeper to his
guests, a possessor of land who holds it open to the public to the visiting public, and one who
voluntarily undertakes custody of another to the one in custody. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314A(1)–(4) (1965). Though these situations may not always be classified as easy
rescue, it is likely that on balance the requirement that the rescue act need only be
“reasonable,” id. § 314A(1), ensures this. For a discussion of some of the case law that tends
toward expanding the duty, see infra Part II.
13. See infra notes 97–113.
14. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part II.
16. E.g., Nancy Benac, Pretty Good Samaritans: Unlike European Countries, the United
States Has Generally Chosen Not to Adopt Laws Requiring Residents to Help Someone in Need,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 27, 1997, at 2C (“It was a rare case of prosecution in America
for failing to help someone in need.”).
17. See supra note 7.
18. See infra Part II.
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maintain an impressive stronghold. The discussion that continues is
broad—each side takes its own stance on the realistic likelihood of
20
21
successfully defining legal causation, respecting individual liberty,
22
overcoming the practical difficulties of enforcement, and wrestling
with the special relationship and affirmative act exceptions to the
23
duty to rescue should it expand.
The academic and policy discussion of the no-duty-to-rescue
rule, however, has thus far excluded a thorough analysis of an
external cost to requiring rescue that may tip the debate: decreasing
24
the possibility of heroes. Heroic acts are valuable from a social
standpoint because they provide an ideal to which citizens can aspire,
inspire hope, serve as a means of spiritual absolution, and benefit
people who are rescued. They are also valuable from a legal
standpoint because they provide a foil for the acts of the reasonable
man, steadying the law by offering an example of what it should not
25
require. Looking critically at the effect upon heroes of expanding
the duty to rescue is about the autonomous self in that it advocates a
society in which strongly defined heroes are advantageous to
individuals. This critical analysis is also about utility in that heroes
create a host of social benefits. But arguing for a greater
consideration of heroes does not precisely conform to the enduring
tensions between the autonomist common law and the modern
utilitarian trend. Rather, it exists, more than not, outside that debate,
campaigning for a figure that is crucial to society and the law.
26
The wide range of views on what constitutes heroism, however,
makes the concept difficult to define. A recluse who highly cherishes
autonomy may view an easy rescue, such as picking up a baby from
the railroad tracks, as expensive because it forces him to give up his
freedom not to act. At the other end of the moral spectrum, another
may unflinchingly sacrifice his own life to save another.
For the purposes of this discussion, however, it is oddly both
important to define the term as clearly as possible while
simultaneously remembering that this is hugely difficult, if not
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra notes 97–126 and accompanying text.
Adler, supra note 1, at 912–13.
Id. at 914.
Id. at 919.
Id. at 886, 888.
See supra note 1.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.A.
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impossible, to accomplish. In the former vein, the definition of “hero”
in this Note reflects the context of physical rescue in a particular
instant, and thus encapsulates one who stands to lose something
important by attempting to rescue another—one who risks serious
injury (mental or physical) or financial loss through an act. With
regard to the latter point, however, it is crucial that the term retain
some ambiguity. Because what constitutes “something important”
varies according to the would-be rescuer, the movement of the legal
line remains important regardless of what precisely the law may ever
require. In order to have repercussions, the law need not necessarily
require an extreme measure; instead, it may require only gradations
of heroic acts and, in doing so, still have pointed effects. It is the very
personal meaning of the word “hero”—like the meaning of the word
“reasonable”—that makes its care essential. Like the ongoing debate
about the reasonable man, the debate about the hero should focus on
the ongoing evolution of the creature, rather than on one particular
perspective on his nature.
When states pass duty-to-rescue statutes, they necessarily impose
their own legal definition of heroism by declaring that a certain
course of action is not heroic, but legally required. Making the hero a
reasonable man infringes upon a complex social construct that by its
nature is anything but reasonable. Even when expanded duties go
unenforced, such legislation tinkers with the understanding of the
hero, distorting and ultimately decreasing its meaning. This
consideration is particularly crucial at present, when the vast majority
27
of states have not yet created an affirmative duty to rescue and
experience suggests that such legislation often reacts to horrific
failures to rescue, and is therefore likely produced with more haste
28
than thought.
29
Amidst the debate between autonomists and utilitarians, this
Note argues that the significance of heroes is another, separate factor
that ought to be considered by those who would shift the line of the
law to gradually erode the no-duty rule, and in so doing, narrow the
realm of potential heroic acts. The Note proceeds as follows: Part I
reviews the historical common law prohibition against requiring any
duty whatsoever. Part II examines the slow erosion of the common
law no-duty rule, including the evolution of the Restatement and
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra notes 193–201 and accompanying text.
29. See supra notes 15–23 and accompanying text.
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Good Samaritan laws, and discusses the theoretical and philosophical
views motivating the movement. Finally, Part III departs from
conventional legal wisdom by investigating the implications not for
the liberty of a would-be rescuer or the safety of a potential rescuee,
but for heroes in a society that legally compels rescue. It investigates
the definition of heroes and heroic acts and explains their
significance, ultimately arguing that increasing legal duties affects
heroes in ways that merit a new and focused attention.
I. THE NO-DUTY RULE AT COMMON LAW
Historically, Anglo-American common law required no duty to
rescue, even if the rescue would be easy or inexpensive, costing the
30
would-be rescuer nothing but time or loss of autonomy. The rule
made for case law rich in disturbing examples, in which callous
bystanders simply watched as easily savable victims suffered before
31
them. The case of Buch v. Armory Manufacturing Co., for instance,
has been memorialized for its depiction of a particularly gruesome
hypothetical scene in which a bystander sees a young child on the
railroad tracks.
He can easily rescue the child, with entire safety to himself, and the
instincts of humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may,
perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but
he is not liable in damages for the child’s injury, or indictable under
32
the statute for its death.

30. Charles O. Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in
THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 23, 23–24 (James M. Ratcliff ed., 1966) (“Our common
law has always refused to transmute moral duties into legal duties. . . . [I]t is clear at common
law that nobody has to lift a finger—let alone spend a dime and dial a phone number or actually
render aid—to help a stranger in peril or distress.” (citations omitted)).
31. Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1899). The case itself was not exactly about
the duty to rescue, rather about whether a young boy—whose hand was injured when it became
stuck in the gears of a machine at a mill—could recover, despite the fact that he was trespassing
upon the property. Id. at 810. Chief Justice Carpenter seems to have created the hypothetical
about the baby on the railroad tracks to justify his admittedly harsh decision not to allow for
recovery. See id. (observing that in cases involving small children, courts have sometimes
inappropriately blurred moral sentiment and the law).
32. Id. The passage has been the inspiration for the titles of several law review articles. See,
e.g., Norman J. Finkel, Moral Monsters and Patriot Acts: Rights and Duties in the Worst of
Times, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 242 (2006); Lipkin, supra note 11.
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The real—rather than hypothetical—cases have been no less
33
dramatic or shocking.
Despite the potential for disturbing outcomes, the no-duty rule
was essentially justified by three arguments. First, a legal requirement
to rescue would invade autonomy, which is closely related to two
other propositions: the consent-of-the-governed rationale and the
harm principle. Second, creating a duty would run counter to natural
law principles. Finally, religious sensibility was expected to fill any
potential gap left by legally requiring so little action.
Of these, the autonomy discussion has been most prevalent. The
distinctly American sensibility of autonomy—noted as early as the
34
country’s inception by Alexis de Tocqueville —is strongly credited
with the formulation of and adherence to this rule, which upholds the
freedom to decide whether or not to rescue at the expense of injury to
35
a victim. And despite notorious descriptions of pitiless bystanders
who simply look on as victims perish, there is some sense that
discomfort with imposing a duty to rescue reflects a genuine and
36
warranted concern about liberty. Viewing the requirement of action
as an infringement assumes that one values what is being infringed
upon: control over one’s own decisions is fundamental from the
37
autonomist’s perspective. For some, these are high stakes, and

33. In Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959), for example, the defendant taunted the
plaintiff, ultimately convincing him to jump into a trench that was at least eight feet deep. Id. at
343. He drowned. In considering whether Yania’s estate could recover for Bigan’s failure to
rescue him, the court dismissed the argument that Bigan had placed Yania in his position of
peril. Id. at 345. Instead, Yania was responsible for his own actions, and Bigan was consequently
under no legal obligation to rescue him. Id. at 346.
34. G.W. PIERSON, TOCQUEVILLE IN AMERICA 161 (1938) (“It’s really an incredible thing,
I assure you, to see how this people keeps itself in order through the single conviction that its
only safeguard against itself lies in itself.”). Another bedrock of American identity, Patrick
Henry’s oft-quoted quip, “Give me liberty or give me death,” has been taken as shorthand for
the notion that “liberty . . . is more valuable than security.” Alan Calnan, Strict Liability and the
Liberal-Justice Theory of Torts, 38 N.M. L. REV. 95, 103 n.33 (2008).
35. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at
373 (5th ed. 1984) (noting the “highly individualistic philosophy of the older common law”).
36. See George P. Fletcher, On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1443, 1451 (1994) (discussing “the problem with affirmative duties”).
37. See id. (“All of a sudden you find yourself next to the pond with the proverbial
drowning child. You must act now. It matters not that you are not in the mood to be a hero or
that you have something better to do. There is nothing quite so unpredictable and insistent as
having the circumstances determine when and how we must act.”).
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requiring action is seen as an offense to liberty so grave that it
38
equates to “[making] man a slave.”
The autonomy argument is linked to the consent-of-thegoverned rationale, which holds that citizens legitimize their
government by consenting to it because it reflects their autonomous
39
choices. A lack of freedom of choice in the law, then, is an affront
both to individual liberty and individuals who would sustain a
legitimate government.
The importance of individual liberty is also linked to the harm
principle—the notion that a legal wrong is constituted only when a
40
harm is inflicted. The common law’s commitment to punishing
41
misfeasance (essentially, a bad act) but ignoring nonfeasance
42
(essentially, a non act) further supported a system that refrained
43
from prosecuting the absence of rescue. This development grew
naturally from a “highly individualistic philosophy of the older
common law [which] had no great difficulty in working out restraints
upon the commission of affirmative acts of harm, but shrank from
converting the courts into an agency for forcing men to help one
44
another.” The distinction between omissions and acts is more
formally justified by noting that the former results in no change to the
victims’ situations—at most a missed opportunity to benefit them—

38. Robert L. Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM. L.
REV. 196, 214 (1946).
39. Lipkin, supra note 11, at 277.
40. Id. at 279; see also id. at 279 & n.158 (arguing that autonomous individuals would likely
endorse the harm principle, which prohibits injurious interference with another’s person,
property, or interests). The principle reinforces the notion of the individual as beyond the reach
of a government seeking to impose a duty to aid rule. Id. at 282 n.179.
41. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 56, at 373 (“There arose very early a difference,
still deeply rooted in the law of negligence, between ‘misfeasance’ and ‘nonfeasance’—that is to
say, between active misconduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction or a
failure to take steps to protect them from harm.”).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 7, at 251–58 (discussing the lack of a duty to rescue and its
roots in the common-law distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance). The actual
difference between the two categories, however, has raised much discussion. See, e.g., id. at 249
(describing how the development of the Coase theorem may make the distinction insignificant).
44. KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 56, at 373.
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whereas the latter inflicts positive harm. The rules of causation,
46
linked to the requirement of an act, only compounded this dilemma.
In addition to the forces of social identity and legal structure that
supported an autonomist perspective, the no-duty rule paralleled the
psychological underpinnings of early common law, which recognized
that the desire to rescue—because of its risks—ran counter to the
47
“natural law” principle of self-preservation. The instinct for survival
was so fundamental and ingrained that it could not realistically be
expected to subside in times of potentially life-threatening acts of
rescue.
Finally, it was also assumed that the strength of moral aspirations
and social norms would compensate for the lack of a formal legal
duty. Specifically, the existence and understanding of the divide on
the legal and moral continuum under common law doctrine was
justified by the promise of religion, a moral sphere expected to pick
up where the common law’s harsh disregard for the would-be rescuee
48
left off. Because religions generally promote altruism and self-

45. Weinrib, supra note 7, at 251; see also Terry v. Lincscott Hotel Corp., 617 P.2d 56, 61
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that allegations regarding an omission or nonfeasance did not
constitute a cause of action).
46. See Lipkin, supra note 11, at 267 (“Since liability depends on actually doing something
which results in injury, so-called ‘negative causation’ has no place in tort law. . . . ‘[N]egative
causation’ opens a Pandora’s box of insuperable difficulties.”).
47. See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as
a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1774 (2008) (“[Edward] Coke[, a common
law jurist whose philosophies influenced the Bill of Rights,] agreed with the proposition that
basic principles of justice were built into the natural order itself, asserting that the ‘law of nature
is part of the law of England.’ Moreover, Coke agreed that the fundamental basis of law is
reason rather than will, and that therefore laws that violate basic principles of justice may not
properly be called ‘law’ at all . . . .” (quoting Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 391 (K.B.)
(Coke, C.J.)) (citing 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1608), as
reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE § 69, at 684
(Steve Sheppard ed., 2003))); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593, 623 (1958) (“Natural-law theory . . . in all its protean guises, attempts
to . . . assert that human beings are equally devoted to and united in their conception of aims
(the pursuit of knowledge, justice to their fellow men) other than that of survival . . . .”). This
line of reasoning continues to serve as a justification for at least some form of no-duty rule even
today. See RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS 191 (1987) (noting
that self-sacrifice “represents an evolutionary mistake”); Michael S. Moore, Reply, More on Act
and Crime, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1749, 1799 (1994) (“The instinct for survival or the fear of loss of
one’s own life or bodily integrity may be such that we find it understandable that one could not
be a moral hero. Running from a bear as fast as one can is surely one such example.”).
48. See Sande L. Buhai, Parental Support of Adult Children with Disabilities, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 710, 738–40 (2007) (discussing the idea that Christianity works to elevate society by
encouraging the practice of heroism); Lisa McCabe, Comment, Police Officers’ Duty to Rescue
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49

sacrifice, they would encourage rescue behavior even without the
creation of a legal duty.
50
In In re St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co., for example, a majority
opinion explicitly cited reward in the afterlife as a kind of damages
for a group of rescuers who saved lives from a sinking ship and
subsequently sought compensation from the pool of money awarded
the towing company. In denying their claim, the court noted: “What
they did was inspired by the spirit which since Christendom has been
the foundation of the great brotherhood of mankind. . . . Their reward
they have; it never can be taken from them, and it is measured by a
51
standard greater than money.”
Jesus Christ responds similarly to the question arguably at the
heart of the intersection of religion and tort law—“Who is my
52
neighbour?” —with a parable that seems designed to teach the moral
duty to aid rule. In it, a Samaritan who “show[s] mercy” to a man
beaten and left for dead by robbers is deemed to have “proved [his]
neighbor,” and Jesus encourages his followers to “‘[g]o, and do thou
53
54
likewise.’” These and other moments in the New Testament reveal
55
a sort of superhuman standard that stands in stark contrast to the

or Aid: Are They Only Good Samaritans?, 72 CAL. L. REV. 661, 678 (1984) (“[A]cts that aspire
toward human perfection . . . are better left with an individual’s inner morality . . . .”).
49. See JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS, HUMAN NATURE AFTER DARWIN 156 (2000)
(“[R]eligions nearly always promise that self-sacrifice now will reap enormous rewards later.”).
50. In re St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co. (The Eastland), 262 F. 535 (N.D. Ill. 1919).
51. Id. at 540.
52. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 580 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) (U.K.).
See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 53, at 358–59 (discussing the evolution of the
concept of one’s “neighbor” in tort law).
53. Luke 10:25–37 (American Standard). The moment is also referenced in Buch v. Amory
Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1898). See supra note 31.
54. See, e.g., John 15:13 (American Standard) (“Greater love has no man than this, that a
man lay down his life for his friends.”). The same quote is embossed on each Carnegie Hero
Foundation medal given posthumously. Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, http://www.
carnegiehero.org/fund_history.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2009); see also infra notes 138–40 and
accompanying text.
55. Jesus’s approach seems attributable to his extremely sensitized empathy, or rachamin.
See DONALD MCNEIL ET AL., COMPASSION: A REFLECTION ON THE CHRISTIAN LIFE 16–17
(1983) (“He became lost with the lost, hungry with the hungry, and sick with the sick.”).
Similarly, many contemporary heroes credit their faith with their ability to engage in
superhuman efforts despite severe illness. See, e.g., MARIA TARNAWSKA, SISTER FAUSTINA
KOWALSKA: HER LIFE AND MISSION 318–19 (Anne Hargest-Gorzelak trans., 1989) (“Although
loneliness and darkness and sufferings of all kinds beat against my heart, the mysterious power
of God supports and strengthens me.”).
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inaction permitted by the law, even surpassing a moral stance that
56
would advocate for the requirement of an easy rescue.
By comparison, legal scholars have remarked upon the stark
57
contrast between law and religion on this point. In Donoghue v.
58
Stevenson, Lord Atkin made an early attempt at describing the tort
concept of duty by referring to the same Biblical scene, noting, “The
rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must
not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my
59
neighbour? receives a restricted reply.” To the extent that law
60
conforms itself to the expectations of the reasonable man, religious
views on the duty to aid are of a different world.
In sum, the strong stance against a duty to rescue taken in
common law jurisprudence was buttressed by a long list of essential
philosophical and legal concepts that a creation of the duty would
have upset: individual autonomy, consent theory, the harm principle,
and natural law. The position was further strengthened by the
enduring understanding that religion had the capacity to pick up
where the law left off, requiring and rewarding moral acts even if the
courts did not obligate them.
II. THE SLOW EROSION OF THE NO-DUTY RULE
If early common law was the domain of autonomists, then the
recent evolution of the law has been led by utilitarians. The utilitarian
view privileges the benefits of easy rescue over the loss of autonomy
61
that the common law traditionally upheld. The view is buoyed by

56. For this stance, see Lipkin, supra note 11, at 293. “[N]umerous emergencies arise when
rescues can be effected safely and easily by observers who have no special relation to the victim.
Requiring easy rescue will save lives and reduce injury at virtually no cost.” Id.
57. See, e.g., Sungeeta Jain, How Many People Does It Take to Save a Drowning Baby?: A
Good Samaritan Statute in Washington State, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1181, 1181–82 (1999)
(recounting the Biblical story of the Good Samaritan before noting that “[m]ost American
states . . . do not have Good Samaritan laws,” but “[i]nstead . . . follow the common law ‘no duty
to rescue’ rule that states that bystanders have no duty to come to the aid of those in peril”).
58. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) (U.K.).
59. Id. at 580.
60. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 32, at 173 (discussing the reasonable person and
noting that “[t]he whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard of
behavior”).
61. Michael A. Santoro, Human Rights and Human Needs: Diverse Moral Principles
Justifying Third World Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
923, 936–37 (2006) (“A [utilitarian] premise of the duty of rescue is that the cost to the rescuer
or others must not be so great as to (in the extreme case) outweigh the benefit to the person
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62

humanitarian concerns that have motivated a gradual erosion of the
no-duty rule.
There are several reasons behind the slow but steady
promulgation of the duty to rescue. First, there is the sense that, in
general, “[c]hanging social conditions lead constantly to the
63
recognition of new duties.” More specifically, there is the sense that
the expansion of the duty to rescue has been necessitated by religion’s
64
decreasing ability to hold fast society’s moral sensibilities. This view
makes the movement a reaction to a contemporary reality the
common law did not foresee, and insists that social norms can no
longer be trusted to encourage moral action when the law does not
require it. In addition to a general malaise about the likelihood of
public good-doing, the movement can also be attributed to specific
piecemeal changes via case law, in which courts consistently found
65
exception to the harshness of the no-duty rule. Further, legislative
responses to horrific and widely publicized stories of desensitized
onlookers who refused to act also altered the legal landscape of the
66
rule. And finally, there has been a steadily rising call in legal
67
literature for a duty in easy rescue cases. To date, the movement has
seen concrete progress in at least three ways: a Restatement section
formally imposing a duty to rescue in four specific scenarios, the
development of a body of cases addressing that section, and statutory

being rescued. The less burdensome it is for the rescuer and the greater the benefit to the
person being rescued, the more compelling is the obligation to act.” (citation omitted)).
62. This Note characterizes this shift as “humanitarian,” using the word’s more colloquial
meaning without exploring its full philosophical connotations. Other authors discuss more
thoroughly the movement’s humanitarian origins. See Julie Stone Peters, “Literature,” the
“Rights of Man,” and Narratives of Atrocity: Historical Backgrounds to the Culture of Testimony,
17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 253, 261 (2005) (“Rights and the humanitarian duty to aid were, in a
sense, two sides of the very definition of what it was to be human: One had rights by virtue of
one’s humanity . . . and it was one’s sense of obligation to another’s suffering that proved one
human . . . .”); Jennifer L. Groninger, Comment, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really
Leave a Victim Lying in the Street? What is Left of the American Rule, and Will It Survive
Unabated?, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 353, 362 n.104 (1999) (discussing the “acknowledged tendency of
courts to expand the category of special relationships based on humanitarian concerns”).
63. KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 53, at 359.
64. See id. § 56, at 375 (“The remedy in [duty to aid cases] is left to the ‘higher law’ and the
‘voice of conscience,’ which, in a wicked world, would seem to be singularly ineffective either to
prevent the harm or to compensate the victim.” (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P.
281, 282 (Kan. 1903))).
65. See infra notes 88–96.
66. See infra notes 193–201 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 4.
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rules propagated by individual states, also known as Good Samaritan
laws.
First, Section 314A of the Second Restatement and its caveat and
68
comment codified a gradual shift in case law that recognized a duty
69
to rescue in certain circumstances. At first, a sort of contractual duty
to aid resulted in cases in which people held themselves out as
performers of a public service and then breached their duty in that
70
performance. From there, the case law began to recognize a duty to
aid between two parties whose relationship maintained certain
characteristics that made that duty reasonable. In short, legal duties
to rescue have been applied in the presence of a mismatched
relationship, in which the plaintiff is relatively dependent upon the
71
defendant or at an economic disadvantage.
The four formal categories of exceptions to the no-duty rule as
described in the Second Restatement § 314A (the duties of a common
carrier to its passengers, an innkeeper to his guests, a “possessor of
land who holds it open to the public” to the visiting public, and one
who voluntarily undertakes custody of another to the one in
72
73
custody) are variations on the patterns recognized by case law.
More precisely, the Restatement relationships derive from scenarios
in which the would-be rescuer limits the victim’s options for rescue by
choosing to invite him into a closed sphere—his own carrier, inn,
74
land, or care.
The caveat to § 314A takes care to note that the writers of the
Restatement “[express] no opinion as to whether there may not be
75
other relations which impose a similar duty.” Comment (b)

68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
69. Id. § 314A cmt. c (recognizing the law’s evolution to include limited duties to rescue in
“situations in which there was some special relation between the parties”).
70. KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 56, at 373.
71. Id. at 374.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A.
73. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 56, at 374 (“In such relationships the plaintiff is
typically in some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who,
correspondingly, holds considerable power over the plaintiff’s welfare.”). These patterns have
also been classified as stemming from the “ability condition” and the “dependency condition.”
Lipkin, supra note 11, at 264–65.
74. See Peter F. Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue, 46
DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 318 (1997) (discussing in part “how the weakness of the argument to limit
liability makes remote-rescue cases more appealing cases to courts than some other rescue cases
in which the fear of unlimited liability is greater”).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A caveat.
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emphasizes the “question . . . left open by the Caveat,” but notes that
even so “[t]he law appears . . . to be working slowly toward a
recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relation of dependence
76
or of mutual dependence.” More helpfully, the comment pinpoints
the commonality among the four duties, that is, that they “arise out of
special relations between the parties, which create a special
77
responsibility, and take the case out of the general rule.”
The meaning and extent of these “special relationships” has been
the subject of many cases that take up the question of § 314A. The
results have generally aligned with the four duties specifically
78
prescribed. Cases such as Thornton v. City of Flint, which recognized
a special relationship between the city and an incarcerated plaintiff
79
80
injured on the premises, and Brown v. Knight, which found a
special relationship between the host of a summer-school picnic and a
81
young child injured while there, both conform to the Restatement
view that there is a special relationship when one voluntarily takes
82
custody of another.
Similarly, courts have often refused to find a special relationship
that would warrant a duty to rescue when the situation does not align
83
with one of the scenarios outlined in § 314A. In Iseberg v. Gross, an
Illinois court found no special relationship between business
84
partners, some of whom had failed to tell another partner that an
85
investor had made threats on his life. In so doing, the court rejected
the plaintiff’s theory that the special relationship limitation had been
eroded to the point that it was “out of step with contemporary

76. Id. § 314A cmt. b.
77. Id.; see also id. (“The relations listed are not intended to be exclusive, and are not
necessarily the only ones in which a duty of affirmative action for the aid or protection of
another may be found. There may be other such relations, as for example that of husband and
wife, where the duty is recognized by the criminal law, but there have as yet been no decisions
allowing recovery in tort in jurisdictions where negligence actions between husband and wife for
personal injuries are permitted. The question is therefore left open by the Caveat, preceding
Comment a above. The law appears, however, to be working slowly toward a recognition of the
duty to aid or protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual dependence.”).
78. Thornton v. City of Flint, 197 N.W.2d 485 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
79. Id. at 493.
80. Brown v. Knight, 285 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1972).
81. Id. at 791–92.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4).
83. Iseberg v. Gross, 879 N.E.2d 278 (Ill. 2007).
84. Id. at 292.
85. Id. at 282.
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The
notion
that
the
“affirmative
societal
morals.”
duty . . . particularly in situations where the parties are not strangers,
should be a policy determination, made on a case-by-case basis” was
87
precluded by the special relationship requirement of § 314A.
In some cases, however, courts have used the common principles
behind § 314A to find a special relationship not explicitly described
by the Restatement. It is these sorts of cases that characterize a steady
move away from the strict common law adherence to the no-duty
rule, or even the four Restatement exceptions. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota, for instance, found a special relationship between an
owner of a farm and a minor guest who was sexually abused by the
88
owner’s boyfriend, reasoning that the plaintiff, as a child, had no
89
“normal opportunities for self-protection.” In Furek v. University of
90
Delaware, heralded as the case that marked the end of the
91
bystander, the Delaware Supreme Court created a special
relationship between a university and a student injured during
92
fraternity hazing activities. The court based its decision upon two
93
§ 314A exceptions: voluntary assumption of another and business
94
invitee status. Additionally, decisions such as the 2002 case of
95
Schieszler v. Ferrum College, in which a federal court found a special
relationship between a university and a student that legally compelled
96
the university to take reasonable measures to prevent his suicide,

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 288–89.
Id. at 288.
Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Minn. 2007).
Id. at 666; see also id. at 665–67 (analyzing whether a special relationship existed).
Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991).
ROBERT D. BICKEL & PETER F. LAKE, THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
MODERN UNIVERSITY: WHO ASSUMES THE RISKS OF COLLEGE LIFE? 127–30 (1999).
92. Furek, 594 A.2d at 519; see also Kathleen Connolly Butler, Shared Responsibility: The
Duty to Legal Externs, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 84 (2003) (“The court rejected the idea that [the]
‘student and the university operate at arms-length, with the student responsible for exercising
judgment for his or her own protection when dealing with other students or student groups.’
Given the nature of the relationship, the duty owed was limited, but a duty was owed.” (quoting
Furek, 594 A.2d at 517)).
93. Furek, 594 A.2d at 517 n.8.
94. Id. at 522 n.17.
95. Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002).
96. Id. at 611; see also Heather E. Moore, University Liability When Students Commit
Suicide: Expanding the Scope of the Special Relationship, 40 IND. L. REV. 423, 431 (2007)
(discussing the case in some detail and noting that it was the first signal to universities that the
law relating to liability and suicide was in flux).
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suggest a pattern of expansion of the duty beyond the four
Restatement exceptions.
These shifts have also been captured in Good Samaritan statutes
97
98
99
at the state level. Massachusetts, Minnesota, Rhode Island,
100
101
Wisconsin, and Vermont are a sampling of states with an
97. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2002). The statute provides that:
Whoever knows that another person is a victim of aggravated rape, rape, murder,
manslaughter or armed robbery and is at the scene of said crime shall, to the extent
that said person can do so without danger or peril to himself or others, report said
crime to an appropriate law enforcement official as soon as reasonably practicable.
Any person who violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than five
hundred nor more than two thousand and five hundred dollars.
Id.
98. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1 (2008). The statute provides that:
Duty to assist. A person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person
is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the person
can do so without danger or peril to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the
exposed person. Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting to obtain
aid from law enforcement or medical personnel. A person who violates this
subdivision is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
Id.
99. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-3.1 to -3.4 (2002). The statute provides that:
§ 11-37-3.1 Duty to report sexual assault. – Any person, other than the victim, who
knows or has reason to know that a first degree sexual assault or attempted first
degree sexual assault is taking place in his or her presence shall immediately notify
the state police or the police department of the city or town in which the assault or
attempted assault is taking place of the crime.
§ 11-37-3.2 Necessity of complaint from victim. – No person shall be charged under
§ 11-37-3.1 unless and until the police department investigating the incident obtains
from the victim a signed complaint against the person alleging a violation of § 11-373.1.
§ 11-37-3.3 Failure to report – Penalty. – Any person who knowingly fails to report a
sexual assault or attempted sexual assault as required under § 11-37-3.1 shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not
more than one year, or fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.
§ 11-37-3.4 – Immunity from liability. – Any person participating in good faith in
making a report pursuant to § 11-37-3.1 shall have immunity from any liability, civil or
criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Any participant shall have the
same immunity with respect to participation in any judicial proceeding resulting from
the report.
Id.
100. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002). The statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the
extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without
interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the
exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.
....
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not
more than $100.00.
Id.
101. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2005). The statute provides, in relevant part:
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102

affirmative duty to rescue. Although these statutes demand action
in only some form, and in only some cases, and none provide for
103
prison time of more than one year or penalties of more than $2500
104
for failure to act, the relatively new requirements are in keeping
with a general trend that moves the law further down the continuum
into what was once strictly a moral realm.
Minnesota requires “[a] person at the scene of an emergency
who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave
physical harm” to “give reasonable assistance” as long as he can do so
105
without posing a danger to himself or others. The law takes care to
note that this can simply mean contacting law enforcement or medical
106
personnel. The Rhode Island statute is almost identical, though it
107
does not provide an example of “reasonable assistance.”
Massachusetts, on the other hand, requires only that a witness to
certain enumerated crimes—“aggravated rape, rape, murder,
manslaughter or armed robbery”—report the crime to law

(1)(a) Whoever violates sub. (2)(a) is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.
....
(2)(a) Any person who knows that a crime is being committed and that a victim is
exposed to bodily harm shall summon law enforcement officers or other assistance or
shall provide assistance to the victim.
....
(d) A person need not comply with this subsection if any of the following apply:
1. Compliance would place him or her in danger.
2. Compliance would interfere with duties the person owes to others.
3. In the circumstances described under par. (a), assistance is being summoned or
provided by others.
Id.
102. Some other states also maintain various forms of a duty to rescue statute. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 794.027 (2009) (requiring one who “observes the commission of the crime of sexual
battery” to “seek assistance for the victim or victims by immediately reporting such offense to a
law enforcement officer”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) (“[N]o
person, knowing that a felony has been or is being committed, shall knowingly fail to report
such information to law enforcement authorities.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.160 (2009)
(describing the “crime of failing to summon assistance”). This Note discusses just five such
statutes.
103. The Rhode Island law allows the possibility of up to one year of imprisonment. R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-3.3.
104. Failure to report the enumerated witnessed crimes in Massachusetts carries a fine of
between $500 and $2500. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2002).
105. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 01 (2008).
106. Id.
107. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-3.1 to -3.4. The law also pertains only to first-degree sexual
assault. Id. § 11-37.3.1.
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enforcement as soon as reasonably practicable, provided this can be
108
done without danger to oneself or others. Wisconsin’s variation of a
Good Samaritan statute compels a duty to aid a victim or “summon
law enforcement officers or other assistance” if it would not place the
109
actor in danger or interfere with duties owed to others. One is also
not required to act if help has already been called or is being provided
or if the instance has already been reported to law enforcement
110
officials. But Wisconsin narrows the duty by requiring these actions
111
only when one “knows that a crime is being committed.”
Interestingly, by addressing only criminal acts, this leaves to die the
112
baby on the railroad tracks. Finally, Vermont requires “reasonable
assistance” when one “knows that another is exposed to grave
physical harm,” but does not expressly require that the rescuer in fact
113
be at the scene of the emergency.
Taken together, there seems to be a crucial tradeoff at play in the
approach of these five states. Wisconsin and Massachusetts require a
duty to aid only when a crime is being committed—the former
114
commanding action for the witness of any crime, and the latter
115
requiring action only in the case of particular crimes. But, in
exchange, two of the three states that more broadly require action
even when the potential rescuee is not the victim of a crime—
Minnesota and Rhode Island—narrow the duty by requiring the
116
rescuer to be at the scene of the emergency. The third, Vermont,
cuts a broader swath through both of these requirements: the rescuer
need have only knowledge (not be present at the scene) and that
117
knowledge need be only of a danger (not necessarily of a crime).
Despite
their
intriguing
drafting
differences,
many
commonalities among the statutes are striking. All five states insist
upon some form of aid only if that aid would not present a harm or

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(a) (West 2005).
Id. § 940.34(2)(d)(3).
Id. § 940.34(2)(a) (emphasis added).
See supra Part I.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2002).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(a).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2002).
MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-3.1 to -3.4 (2002).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a).
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118

danger to oneself or others. Two of the states further constrict the
119
duty by using the term “reasonable assistance,” and Massachusetts
essentially defines the term “reasonable” by itemizing the only crimes
120
that require action if witnessed. Three of the states—Minnesota,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin—note that simply enlisting some form
121
of professional aid may suffice.
These similarities reveal a sense of the tight, constrained nature
of the duty, described in ways that are almost visibly painstaking and
deliberate. Layer upon layer of constricting stipulations narrowing
the duty are only punctuated by the statutes’ comparably light
penalties. Only Rhode Island and Wisconsin provide for potential
prison time—the former for up to one year, the latter for up to just
thirty days—but both statutes offer the alternative of fines up to
122
123
$500. Massachusetts provides for the greatest fines—up to $2500 —
124
whereas Minnesota provides for a fine of up to $300,
and
Vermont—perhaps tempering its more liberal view of the duty—does
125
the same. Further, the minimal amount of prosecution under these
126
statutes may emphasize the apparent hesitancy to force the issue or
the dearth of situations in which people act—and are caught acting—
with callous disregard for another’s plight.
The Restatement, case law, and statutes have added much to the
ongoing discussion of the duty to rescue. But so far, that discussion
has been primarily dominated by two camps: the autonomists in favor
of a limited duty and the utilitarian humanitarians in favor of
expanding it. As a result, the debate has neglected to fully consider

118. This interpretation presumes that the Wisconsin statute’s provision that the action not
“interfere with duties the person owes to others,” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(d), includes a
duty of not posing a danger to others.
119. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01(1) subdiv. 1; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a).
120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40.
121. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(d).
122. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-3.3 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(1)(a) (making violations
a Class C misdemeanor in reference to WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.51(3)(c)).
123. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40.
124. Minnesota classifies a violation of its Good Samaritan statute as a petty misdemeanor,
MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1, for which the penalty cannot exceed $300, id. § 609.02 subdiv.
4a.
125. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(c) (2002).
126. See Benac, supra note 16 (quoting Duke University School of Law Professor Sara Sun
Beale as noting that “there’s a fairly big feeling that if you want to be Mother Teresa, you can
be Mother Teresa . . . . [b]ut putting yourself at risk or going out of your way is seen as a choice,
not a socially enforceable obligation”).
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another, separate element: the effect of expanding the duty on
heroes.
III. HEROES AND THE DUTY TO RESCUE
If the law’s initial reaction was to favor the rescuer by protecting
his duty not to aid, then its more recent approach has been to begin to
side with the rescuee. But this humanitarian argument focuses on
bettering the situations of two of the three key players: the rescuee
127
and society at large. That this approach limits the choices of the
128
third player, the rescuer, has been well considered. What has not
been thoroughly accounted for is society’s perception of the rescuer
as he is forced by the law to commit acts that were once considered
voluntary; that is, the repercussions of mandating good acts on the
129
existence and understanding of heroes remain largely unexplored.
In sum, the reasons for imposing a duty to aid have centered on the
benefits accrued by both the victim and a society that backs its ideals
with the force of law, but less so on the rescuer and the detriments to
a society—and its laws—that forces such moral choices by the threat
of legal sanction.
The argument about the importance of heroes in society relies on
at least two propositions: one, that society understands what heroes
are, and two, that they are valuable. The first warrants an attempt at
defining heroes, the second an effort at describing why they matter.
In other words, to understand that heroes should figure in the dutyto-rescue discussion, it is necessary to contend with their meaning on
both a definitional and social scale. This Part addresses each in turn,
before going on to reckon with the potential consequences of
expanding the duty to rescue.
A. The Meaning of the Word “Hero”
130

Society defines heroes rather messily. Generally, the term takes
in a wide swath of possibilities. Heroes earn their moniker because
131
they perform good deeds over time, because they are objects of
127. See supra note 62.
128. See supra Part I.
129. See supra note 7.
130. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 543 (10th ed. 1996) (defining
hero as “a mythological or legendary figure . . . with great strength or ability; . . . a man admired
for his achievements and noble qualities”).
131. See infra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
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societal respect, or because they act with bravery. Heroes might
134
be people who sacrifice their lives or merely their time. They may
even disagree with society’s perception of how much they have
sacrificed. The observable tendency of people dubbed “heroes” to
135
respond, “I don’t feel like a hero,” demonstrates the dilemma of
defining the term: there is fundamental disagreement about what it
means, even among those on whom society would bestow the title.
Stemming from this definitional quandary, the simple fact that easy
rescue does not seem reasonable to everyone—as illustrated by
egregious acts that go uninterrupted by seemingly heartless
136
137
bystanders —often encourages proponents of expanding the duty.
This kind of problem requires a more thorough investigation of what
is really reasonable.
Society may find occasion to define heroes more specifically
when there is a particular purpose behind doing so. The Carnegie
Hero Fund Commission, for example, defines them in their specific
application criteria. The Commission accepts as a candidate for the
Carnegie Medal only a “civilian who voluntarily risks his or her life to
an extraordinary degree while saving or attempting to save the life of
another person. The rescuer must have no full measure of
138
responsibility for the safety of the victim.”
Like duty-to-rescue law, the Carnegie Hero Fund concerns itself
with momentary, physical rescue, rather than a broader conception of
the term “hero.” Easy rescues like the ones mandated by Good
Samaritan statutes are unlikely to qualify for recognition by the
Carnegie Hero Fund. The kinds of rescuers who would qualify are
precisely the kinds of heroes the law never expects—Carnegie’s latter
requirement even seems to rule out the Restatement exceptions as
139
possible situations in which a hero may emerge. It is appropriate,
132. See infra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
135. This was the response of one woman honored by Yad Vashem, an Israeli organization
that honors non-Jews who came to the aid of those persecuted by the Nazis. Geri J. Yonover,
The Lessons of History: Holocaust Education in the United States Public Schools, 26 VT. L. REV.
133, 146–47 (2001).
136. See infra notes 193–99 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 193–99 and accompanying text.
138. Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, http://www.carnegiehero.org/heroFund.php (last
visited Apr. 18, 2009).
139. The Commission’s requirement that the rescuer have no responsibility for the victim
would rule out the four exceptions to the no-duty rule as outlined by § 314A, which delineates
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therefore, that heroes dwell, by Carnegie’s own admission, at the
extreme end of the moral spectrum. Unlike most definitions of
heroes, there is some significance attached to making these
stipulations precise: it narrows the field for the contest and assures
that only the most “thrill[ing]” heroes—what Carnegie called the
140
“heroes of civilization” —receive recognition.
Yet the pursuit of answers to the question considered by
Carnegie and many others—what is heroic and what is simply
reasonable—has thus far been a highly constrained topic in the rescue
141
context. The law shies from the term,
but implicates it by
propagating exceptions to the no-duty rule. The Restatement
exceptions suggest that reasonable rescues in those scenarios are not
heroic in the eyes of the law—instead, they are expected. The same
expectation goes for those professions that by their nature require
rescue and whose duty to rescue is legally prescribed. In fact, under
the “Firefighter’s Rule,” many professional rescuers are not
permitted to recover damages incurred during the course of rescue—
142
instead, they are presumed to have assumed the risk of injury. What
society may look upon with compassion and pity and in fact claim as
143
heroic, the law views as part of an assumed duty, one made
144
reasonable by occupation.
In sum, the debate surrounding the no-duty rule is at least in part
a debate about what it means to be a hero. By expanding a rule to
require certain conduct, the law implicitly defines that conduct as
reasonable. But does this mean that the conduct is consequently not
heroic? The differences between the social and legal approaches to
defining the term is what makes answering such a question so
situations in which the would-be rescuer does have full responsibility for the victim because of
their relationship. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
140. Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, supra note 138.
141. See, e.g., E.H. Loewry, AIDS and the Physician’s Fear of Contagion, 89 CHEST 325,
325–26 (1986) (noting that society’s “expectations of ‘reasonable risk’ necessitates [sic] courage
without demanding heroism”).
142. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. REV.
111, 116 (2008) (“Reckless conduct can provide a basis for recovery for injured professional
rescuers, otherwise barred by the application of the so-called Firefighters’ Rule.”).
143. E.g., Deborah Young, Sunday Morning Mayhem: FDNY Hero Perishes Battling House
Blaze, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, Nov. 24, 2008, at A01.
144. This is in keeping with tort law’s tendency to view foreseeability as a necessary
component to fault. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 29, at 162 (discussing the importance
of foresight in tort). It also conforms to George P. Fletcher’s view that a layman’s duty to rescue
infringes upon individual liberty at least in part because the rescue is demanded spontaneously,
and is therefore unforeseeable. See supra note 37.
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complex. Society applies the term to one who makes everyday
145
sacrifices in raising his children or injures himself in rescuing others
146
from burning buildings; the law, however, is unconcerned with the
147
former and offers no recourse for the latter. The social and legal
realms, like the moral and legal realms, view the question of who is a
hero quite differently.
B. The Significance of Heroes
If heroes were not valuable, society would not care about a rule
that shrinks their realm. Societies value heroes and heroic acts for
reasons that are not always explicit, but that are better ferreted out
from the way in which heroes are discussed and interpreted.
Historically, heroes have enjoyed a kind of cult status. The word
derives from the ancient Greek, heros, which is thought to derive
from a word related to the English word “year”—a linguistic
connection that reflects the seasonal schedule on which heroes were
148
worshipped. Public praise was essential to the nature of heroes, who
were given their title because they “achieved immortality through the
149
local community’s memory and continuing esteem for them.”
Herakles, the most famous of the Greek heroes, serves as a
paradigmatic illustration. Defined primarily by his physical prowess,
not by any artistic skill, Herakles became famous for his many labors,
which tended to include brave, decisive physical action such as killing
150
dangerous animals.
In contemporary culture, heroes retain many of their historic
virtues, and communities continue to admire them in similar ways.
Many modern heroes also take brave and decisive physical action.
Yet a hero need not orchestrate physical violence; instead, the hero
often prevents it. President Ronald Reagan’s 1982 State of the Union
Address, for instance, referenced a government official who had
rescued a woman just two weeks before. The anecdote buttressed the
inspirational tone of his message:
Just 2 weeks ago, in the midst of a terrible tragedy on the
Potomac, we saw again the spirit of American heroism at its finest—
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See infra note 166.
Young, supra note 143.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
RICHARD P. MARTIN, MYTHS OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS 145 (2003).
Id.
Id. at 150–53.
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the heroism of dedicated rescue workers saving crash victims from
icy waters. And we saw the heroism of one of our young
Government employees, Lenny Skutnik, who, when he saw a
woman lose her grip on the helicopter line, dived into the water and
dragged her to safety.
....
. . . Don’t let anyone tell you that America’s best days are behind
her . . . . We’ve seen it triumph too often in our lives to stop
151
believing in it now.

Heroes are intended to be inspirational figures and have, in fact,
inspired others to take real action. In 1904, an explosion in a mine
near Harwick, Pennsylvania left 181 dead—two among the death toll
152
perished while trying to rescue others. The story is what encouraged
Andrew Carnegie to establish the Carnegie Hero Foundation, which
annually pays tribute to fifty individuals for heroic deeds, and has so
far awarded more than nine thousand medals and $30 million in
153
grants to heroes and their survivors.
154
Heroic acts have also been depicted as exercises in freedom,
despite the common law perception that legally requiring those acts
155
would be quite the opposite. Heroic acts have worked as tools of
absolution, too—as in the case of Idaho prisoners, who may seek
reduced sentences as a reward for heroic deeds performed while in
156
the penitentiary. And for those who believe in spiritual absolution,
heroic acts are rewarded with promised recognition in the afterlife as
157
well.
As in ancient times, the formal ways in which heroes are
recognized also serve as a proxy for their social value. In addition to
151. Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress Reporting on the State of
the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 72, 78–79 (Jan. 26, 1982). This stands in stark contrast to the idea of
the no-duty rule as distinctly American. See supra Part I.
152. Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, supra note 54.
153. Id.
154. Anthony M. Kennedy, Law and Belief, TRIAL, July 1998, at 23, 24 (“[W]hen our heroes
are counted, they will be ones who recognized that individual responsibility is a celebration of
freedom, not its denial.”).
155. See supra Part I.
156. Marc A. Franklin & Matthew Ploeger, Of Rescue and Report: Should Tort Law Impose
a Duty to Help Endangered Persons or Abused Children?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 991, 993
(2000).
157. See supra note 49.
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acknowledgment from the highest office in the land, newspapers
regularly relish heroic tales with catchy headlines and portraits of
158
admirable protagonists. Further, organizations such as the Carnegie
Hero Foundation and Yad Vashem, which honors non-Jews who
159
came to the aid of those persecuted during the Nazi takeover, exist
to identify and praise heroes. Less formally, some communities have
established college funds for the survivors of those killed in the
160
performance of heroic acts. Even jury nullification may reveal a
respect for a hero who fails in his heroic effort. In Eckert v. Long
161
Island Railroad Co., the jury had refused to find that the decedent,
who perished while rescuing a four-year-old boy from the path of an
oncoming train, was contributorily negligent, finding instead that
162
death was not foreseeable. The New York Court of Appeals
163
declined to overturn the verdict. One commentator noted that the
nature of the act seems to have persuaded the court that “[s]uch a
heroic effort was clearly worthy of community approbation in spite of
164
the foreseeability of death.” Posthumous praise for the hero was so
important that it trumped application of the law.
To the extent that presidents, newspapers, organizations, and
juries represent a community and its beliefs, these examples support a
more abstract contention: the decision to uphold someone as a hero
can provide insights about the community itself. This social
barometer function of heroes has both anthropological and
philosophical value; the presence of heroes—or lack thereof—has
165
been used to interpret the aspirations and norms of the country.

158. E.g., Football Hero, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 11, 1983, at 18; Jimmie Tramel, True
Hero’s Gift of Life Remembered, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 25, 2005, at B3.
159. See Yonover, supra note 135, at 146–47.
160. See Franklin & Ploeger, supra note 156, at 996.
161. Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
162. Id. at 506.
163. Id. at 508.
164. Jay Tidmarsh, A Process Theory of Torts, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1313, 1383 n.247
(1994).
165. See Finkel, supra note 32, at 249 (“[A] number of media and social commentators were
quick to conclude that these modern anecdotal stories of horrors without civic-minded actions
reflected a decline in civic duty.”); Ted Gest, Are Good Samaritans a Vanishing Breed?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 1983, at 9 (offering reasons for the decline in unsolicited rescue,
including the possibility that it is due to “an increasingly impersonal U.S. society”); Austin
Wehrwein, Enforcement Uncertain: ‘Samaritan’ Law Poses Difficulties, NATL. L.J., Aug. 22,
1983, at 5 (describing the representative who introduced the Minnesota rescue bill as expressing
that “[t]he traditional common-law rule that a bystander has no duty to aid an endangered
person would permit ‘totally unacceptable conduct for civilized society’”); Ruth Youngblood,
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And yet this valuable social construct—like hope, aspiration, and
absolution—cannot survive without the existence of the fundamental
social value of heroes. The most critical value corresponds with the
supposition with which the law is most occupied: heroes do good acts.
In the duty-to-rescue context, they aid people in momentary and dire
166
situations that threaten severe bodily harm and even death. The
utilitarian aspect of heroes is the foundational argument for
167
expanding the duty to rescue. It is also at the heart of the debate
over the pros and cons of legislating heroism.
C. The Consequences to Heroes of Expanding the Duty
There are two ways in which heroes experience negative
consequences as a result of expanding the duty to rescue. This Section
first discusses the problem that stems from the disconnect between
social and legal norms that results from chipping away at the
distinction between the ordinary man and the hero. Tangentially,
blurring this line also makes for more confusion about the meaning of
a heroic act. This Section then addresses counterarguments to these
claims. Finally, this Section closes by offering an on-the-ground
picture of how legislatures tend to enact statutory expansions of the
duty that heightens these theoretical concerns. Such statutes often
arise under reactionary public pressure, resulting in overbroad laws
that wrongly assume they can legislate moral acts. This pattern
threatens to infringe further upon the realm of heroes by failing to
fully evaluate potential effects on heroes in the fray.

Rapes Trigger Calls for New Laws, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 4, 1983, at 3D (“The degeneration of
one person is the degeneration of us all . . . . If a community like ours can solve the problem,
then cities and towns all over the country will seize upon the solution.” (quoting the mayor of
New Bedford, the town in which a young woman was raped in a bar while at least a dozen men
watched)).
166. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 180. Most classic examples of the rule are cases
involving a life-saving rescue. The murder of Kitty Genovese, the public rape of a young woman
on a pool table, and the rape and murder of Sherrice Iverson in Las Vegas—all credited with
incentivizing duty-to-rescue legislation—similarly involve dire situations. See infra notes 193–
201. Consequently, this Note’s discussion focuses on heroes who perform these sorts of acts,
rather than other kinds of heroes, often so called because they perform good deeds over a
longer period of time. See Reagan, supra note 151, at 78 (“And then there are countless quiet,
everyday heroes of American life—parents who sacrifice long and hard so their children will
know a better life than they’ve known . . . .”). Society seems to value both kinds.
167. See, e.g., Philip W. Romohr, A Right/Duty Perspective on the Legal and Philosophical
Foundations of the No-Duty-To-Rescue Rule, 55 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1037 (2006) (“Utilitarians
generally support a duty to rescue others, at least to the extent that such a duty provides
maximum satisfaction to the most people.”).
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1. Expanding the Duty to Rescue Diminishes the Concept of the
Hero and Confuses the Law. Overlapping concepts of heroic and
ordinary acts means a loss for society, which understands and benefits
from heroes because they are separate, moral entities. Heroes are
meaningful because they are fundamentally unlike the rest of
humankind. Historically, this respect was reflected in worship; today,
it is revealed in other public forums, such as a State of the Union
168
address or newspaper stories. But regardless of how society comes
together to pay tribute to them, heroes depend on a community that
holds them up as worthy—and fundamentally separate from the
general populace—for their meaning and their power. Taking heroes
off the pedestal—or confusing the height of the pedestal—by
transforming moral choice into the realm of reasonable choice means
that this clear, necessary separation is lost. If part of the meaning of
heroes is derived from separateness, then lumping them in with the
ordinary man fundamentally changes their meaning and likely makes
them mean less.
This results in fewer opportunities for inspiration, absolution,
and spiritual reward, and for the organizations and news media that
uphold heroes as exemplary to inspire others through consistent and
public recognition of heroic acts. It means a lesser role for heroes as
indicators of society’s nature and aspirations, or as societal
barometers. But it also means a loss for the law, because a clearer
understanding of what is reasonable is lost. Again and again, the law
169
proclaims that it does not require heroes. Instead, their presence
helps to define the most perplexing of all tort creatures by showing
what he is not: the reasonable man. By expanding the duty to rescue,
the law takes on a word with almost exclusively social meaning. In so
doing, it takes on the imprecise social handling of heroes—what they
do and what they mean—and makes them the business of the law. In
short, it turns philosophical questions into legal problems.
Granted, it may be that under special conditions, some acts that
society deems heroic will be deemed reasonable and thus expected by
the law—the two terms are not always mutually exclusive. Firemen
are a prime example. Society celebrates their heroism, and the law

168. See infra Part III.B.
169. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 7, at 261 (“Acts that are beyond the call of duty demand
of the agent extraordinary heroism or sacrifice, and ‘while we praise their performance, we do
not condemn their non-performance.’” (quoting HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS
219 (5th ed. 1893))).
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sees their actions as reasonable. But in that case, the duties of a
170
fireman are explicitly prescribed by law, formally taught in a
171
training school, and voluntarily accepted far in advance. The stamp
of the law over a heroic duty in a context without such structure is
likely to cause far more confusion in comparison to this narrow
circumstance in which people elect to take on a dangerous duty to
help others through their occupation in public safety.
Further, the claim that “anyone would do it” or even that the
conduct is “reasonable” does not mean that the law should
necessarily require the act. This view confuses widespread agreement
172
about what ought to be done with a mandate for legal obligation.
Just because everyone would do it does not mean that everyone
should do it, nor does it mean that a normative argument should be
backed by force of law. Even if reasonable action is not necessarily
the opposite of heroic action, the two terms help to define one
173
another indirectly. The stamp of law, however, forces the two into
an odd dichotomy.
In addition to taking on a broad view of heroes that is merely
inconsistent, requiring rescue may also invite problems relating to
strong disagreements about what defines a hero. For autonomists who
believe that the right to be left alone is more important than ensuring
that the baby be rescued from the railroad tracks, an easy rescue may
constitute heroism, because even that rescue represents a decision to
do something other than nothing. Gradations of this scenario force

170. See supra note 142.
171. E.g., Education Portal, Fireman Training, http://education-portal.com/fireman_training.
html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
172. For a discussion of the interplay between social norms and the law, see generally Cass
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). Sunstein notes that
“[s]uccessful law and policy try to take advantage of learning about norms and norm change.”
Id. at 909. But he also notes: “Many laws have an expressive function. They ‘make a statement’
about how much, and how, a good or bad should be valued. They are an effort to constitute and
to affect social meanings, social norms, and social roles.” Id. at 964.
173. One particularly salient description of the interplay between duty, reasonableness, and
heroics has arisen in the quasi-duty-to-rescue context of doctor responsibility in the face of the
AIDS epidemic. See Loewry, supra note 141, at 325–26 (“Fear of coming to harm as a
consequence of medical practice has been of concern to physicians at least since contagion has
been recognized to exist. The balance among duty, fear, and courage has been a necessary part
of medical practice ever since. . . . Society assumes that the contract [between the healer and the
community] will be honored and the trust kept in time of need. Its expectations of ‘reasonable
risk’ necessitates [sic] courage without demanding heroism. A definition of what is reasonable is
inherent within the context of the situation abroad at the time. The contract is reasonable. It has
endured over the ages and has been hallowed by use.”)
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further questions about the precise degree of foregone opportunity or
incurred risk necessary to deserve the word “hero.” For some,
stopping to rescue the baby on the way to a job interview is heroism;
for others, the act would only be heroic if the train were inches from
the baby when the rescuer retrieved him. Such considerations suggest
that heroism is in the eye of the beholder—that perhaps there is a
general sense of what the term means, but, like the reasonable man,
there is confusion at the margins. In addition, manipulating
philosophical rather than factual hypothetical situations leads to a
different kind of debate.
Consider the requirements of the bystander as laid out by the
statutory rules reviewed in Part II. Proponents of expanding the duty
are right to note that the evolution of the law in Good Samaritan
174
statutes tends to remain gradual. These statutes require relatively
175
little action with relatively little penalty. It does not necessarily
follow, however, that even small expansions of the duty do not
threaten the stability of the hero as a social figure or a foil for the law.
This is most easily seen in the tendency of society to label as “hero”
one who performs precisely what in some states is required by law. A
recent newspaper article, for example, described as “heroic” the
actions of two co-workers, one of whom called 911 when the other
176
was shot by an intruder. But in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin, enlisting the aid of emergency personnel in such a
177
situation is required by law. The use of the term “hero” suggests
that there is some disagreement on the legal and social definition of
the term—what the law would prescribe as required “reasonable
178
assistance,” society upholds as heroic. Even the smallest steps
toward enlarging the duty, it seems, create inconsistencies between

174. See Yeager, supra note 7, at 24–25 (“[A] bystander’s duty does not include the heroism
of invulnerability and infantile omnipotence.”).
175. See supra notes 97–126 and accompanying text.
176. Colleen Kenney, Night Shift from Hell . . . and Back; Jacque Bethune Is Recovering
from a Gunshot Wound to the Mouth, a Crime Never Solved, LINCOLN J. STAR, Nov. 16, 2008, at
A1; see also Christina Hall, As Flames Tear Through Home, Warren Teen Becomes a Hero;
Cops: Mom Drugged Kids’ Hot Chocolate, Set Fire, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 20, 2008, at A1
(describing a 13-year-old boy who guided his sister out of a burning house and called 911 as a
“hero”). Failure to perform the act in the latter case would violate the Minnesota and Wisconsin
statutes. See supra notes 106–07, 110–11 and accompanying text.
177. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1 (2008); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2005).
178. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1.
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social and legal understandings of rescue acts and begin to diminish
the understanding of heroes.
To the extent that “reasonable assistance” remains undefined in
these statutes, the distinction between heroic and non-heroic acts
becomes even more difficult. In Vermont, calling for emergency
179
personnel is not explicitly described as satisfying the statute. Is the
man who witnesses a shooting and calls 911 simply a law-abiding
citizen or a hero? What if he then rushes to the victim’s aid, bringing
a gun along in case the attacker returns? What if he then stays with
the victim until police arrive, periodically shaking him to keep him
awake? Does it matter that the rescuer and victim later learn that the
attacker is a wanted serial killer? Or that the victim calls the other
man a “hero”? Paul Patrick, who narrowly escaped the “Serial
Shooter,” uses the word to describe Saul Guerrero, who came to his
180
aid in each of these ways on the evening of June 8, 2006. But at what
point did he actually become one?
Under the Vermont statute, it remains unclear at what point
Guerrero transforms from the reasonable man into the hero. This is
true regardless of whether a rescuer like Guerrero would ever
realistically be prosecuted under either statute. The point is that the
mere existence of the requirement of “reasonable assistance” creates
confusion that has a real and palpable effect on an understanding of
the difference between reasonable and heroic actors.
2. Response to Counterarguments. It is crucial to address
valuable counterarguments to these points. Those in favor of the duty
to rescue might argue that an expansion of the rule will increase all of
the social values that heroes already promote and allow for more
examples of persons to emulate, more opportunities for absolution,
more cause for public celebration both formally and informally,
spiritual compensation in the afterlife, a social barometer that reflects
a more moral nation, and—the utilitarian’s ultimate goal—more
people saved from injury and death. It follows that the benefit of
normalizing certain good behaviors is that it encourages or even
181
forces conformity.
179. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002).
180. Nick R. Martin, Bearing Witness Against Serial Shooter Suspect: Valley Man Shot in
2006 Testifies, Tells of Life Since Then, MESA TRIB. (Ariz.), Nov. 16, 2008, at A2.
181. See Sunstein, supra note 172, at 910 (“Norms can tax or subsidize choice. Collective
action—in the form of information campaigns, persuasion, economic incentives, or legal
coercion—may be necessary to enable people to change norms that they do not like.”).
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But these social values will exist in an altered form. The social
barometer function of heroes, for instance, is likely to function less
meaningfully if those heroes are acting out of a sense of obligation.
The barometer would better reflect the law itself, rather than those
acting under it, because the decision to expand the duty would tend to
reveal a society committed to the perpetration of good deeds in name
(making it more difficult to measure or identify those good deeds
committed out of true altruism). Similarly, the law would confuse
those trying to determine whom to emulate and about whom to run
182
inspirational new stories. As in Eckert, even when citizens seem
capable of recognizing heroes in spite of the law, they will be forced
to choose between a social and legal understanding of the term. The
confusion that results from such a forced choice—regardless of how
the choice is made—is the damaging aspect of expanding the duty.
Because something at least closer to heroism will be required by law,
the social force of these values are likely to mean at least something
different, and will probably come to mean something less.
Those in favor of expanding the duty may note another kind of
social force also under threat in modern society—religion. If the
common law presumed that religiously inspired altruism would fill
183
any holes left by a lack of a duty to rescue, then a decline in religion
would suggest it can no longer suffice as a remedy. This argument
encounters several problems. First, it is far from clear that religion is
184
experiencing a downturn. Second, the argument presumes that a
moral sensibility unguided by official religious doctrine could
persuade at least an easy rescue. Finally, adoption of this stance takes
on the weakness of the common law presumption that law must shine
a light wherever there is moral darkness (or, as the common law saw
it, that there was no need for such a light where morality already
185
existed). The concern about religion’s shortcomings would make an
ironic argument against more fully allowing the spiritual growth of

182. For the description of a situation in which a jury nullified in favor of a man who
attempted to save a child from an oncoming train, see supra notes 160–63 and accompanying
text.
183. See supra notes 48–56 and accompanying text.
184. Neela Banerjee, Changing Faiths: More Americans than Ever Are Leaving Childhood
Affiliations Behind and Making Their Own Decisions About Religion, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT,
Apr. 4, 2008, at 12–13 (noting that an increase in the percentage of people who claim to be
unaffiliated with a particular religion “does not mean that Americans are becoming less
religious”).
185. See supra notes 48–56 and accompanying text.
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society in another way—by ensuring that its law does not infringe
upon the clear definition of its heroes.
Proponents will also posit that these intangible costs will be more
186
than made up for by the concrete and worthy result of lifesaving.
Bystanders on their own will be required to rescue those in peril, thus
decreasing the cost of undertakings by professional rescuers, who
187
would benefit from a society that demanded laypersons chip in. This
is the same kind of argument made for expanding the duty in the face
of complaints about cost to individual autonomy: the large gain of life
188
trumps the small loss of liberty, and the law is a relatively
189
inexpensive way to shift the norm toward rescue.
But the values lost are not necessarily comparable. And both
kinds of arguments jettison criticisms about the costs of norm shifting
by assuming that the norm actually needs shifting. At least one recent
empirical study shows that a failure to rescue is actually the
190
exception—not the norm. The widespread agreement that easy
rescue seems reasonable may also indicate that the norm of rescue in
some situations already exists, and that therefore legal sanction is
191
unnecessary. Further, this kind of cost-benefit analysis also runs the
risk of assuming that simply because social values are not concretely
measurable, they are somehow less important.

186. See Adler, supra note 1, at 918–19 (“[W]hat society loses in the goodness of
volunteerism, it will recoup in the reduction of blameworthy conduct.”).
187. See Lipkin, supra note 11, at 258 (“A general legal duty to rescue would save lives and
reduce the cost of rescue operations.”).
188. See id. at 288 (“Adopting the harm principle restricts the individual’s freedom to
interfere with and injure others, but enhances his overall freedom by rendering the avenues
traversed through life relatively safe and predictably free from avoidable injury and death. This
sort of calculation is the hallmark of individualism and the first principle of prudential
reasoning.”).
189. See Sunstein, supra note 172, at 908 (“A regulatory policy that targets social norms may
well be the cheapest and most effective strategy available to a government seeking to discourage
risky behavior.”).
190. See David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to
Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 656 (2006) (“[P]roven cases of non-rescues are extraordinarily
rare, and proven cases of rescues are exceedingly common—often in hazardous circumstances,
where a duty to rescue would not apply in the first instance.”). Strong and widespread negative
public reactions to bad bystanders may also suggest that the norm does not need changing. See
infra notes 193–201.
191. This would seem to reveal that the so-called problem is less than imagined, and that the
moral duty to rescue is quietly present. See Sunstein, supra note 172, at 912 (“[W]hen social
norms appear not to be present, it is only because they are so taken for granted that they seem
invisible.”).
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But those in favor of the duty to rescue do maintain one
particularly strong contention: that the law will only require
192
reasonable or perhaps even easy rescue, thereby counteracting all
or at least many of these concerns. If only the most basic and least
dangerous acts of rescue are required, then heroes remain free to
roam the realm of truly heroic acts, maintaining their separate status
and allowing society a full range of their values and the law an
untouched understanding of the reasonable man. But although the
easy rescue is an easy choice for the utilitarian, it is not a concept
likely to be so easily accepted, legislated, or defined for society as a
whole—especially the autonomist. Like the word hero, the meaning
of an easy rescue depends on the would-be rescuer; and differing
views on its meaning confuse the social value of one who rescues: the
hero. Even reasonable rescue threatens the understanding and
meaning of heroes, both because it addresses a concept (heroism)
that varies according to the viewer and because it blurs the line
between the ordinary and the great upon which the very definition of
heroism depends. But if the argument only runs that easy rescue is all
that will ever be asked of a bystander, a cogent response—because
the claim is based upon a prediction about the likely evolution of the
duty to rescue—requires a closer look at how these laws actually
evolve.
3. Legislatures Heighten Theoretical Concerns by Rashly
Expanding Duties to Rescue. A closer look at the genesis of duty-torescue statutes and comparable provisions reveals that the conditions
under which many of the statutes have been enacted are further
reason for pause when considering the expansion of the duty against
the backdrop of heroes.
Three of the five states discussed in this Note with criminal
penalties for failing to act in an emergency created their statutes in
response to a particularly horrifying and well-publicized occasion of
193
what has come to be known as “spectator rape.” On March 6, 1983,
a young woman was repeatedly raped on a pool table by four men in
Big Dan’s Tavern in New Bedford, Massachusetts, while at least a
194
dozen other men looked on. The public outcry was swift and strong;
192. See Adler, supra note 1, at 918 (“Actions that are beyond the call of duty will not be
legally required in any case, so the law will not deprive society of heroes nor deprive individuals
of all opportunities to perform heroically.”).
193. Finkel, supra note 32, at 248.
194. Ellen Goodman, Op-Ed, Horror Show in a Tavern, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 1983.
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almost immediately, legislators in Massachusetts and Rhode Island
195
began clamoring for a change in witness liability law and were
196
ultimately successful in passing duty to aid statutes. Democratic
representative Randy Staten also cited the New Bedford rape as the
197
reason for introducing the bill that is now Minnesota law.
Although the resulting statute does not fall strictly within the
realm of duty-to-rescue statutes, history repeated itself in strikingly
similar circumstances fifteen years later, when a similar nationwide
uproar resulted after seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson was attacked in
a Las Vegas casino bathroom while the attacker’s friend and
classmate, David Cash, watched from a nearby stall. In response,
California unanimously enacted the Sherrice Iverson Child Victim
Protection Act, which created a duty to report child abuse and
198
199
neglect. Nevada followed suit with a similar law.
The Iverson case, like the ones that preceded it, highlighted the
traditionally widespread, emotional response to horrific cases in
which bystanders choose to do nothing when rescue is easy and
200
danger to the victim is great. Duty-to-rescue laws, because they are
so often spurred on by an event overcharged with public sentiment,
run the risk of encouraging impetuous legislation that fails to fully
weigh the ramifications of expanding the duty—including the impact
upon the moral realm of heroes. That this consideration may sound
crass after a brief description of such a parade of callous witnesses
only emphasizes the point that moral outrage easily colors more
201
resigned, measured thought.
195. Youngblood, supra note 165.
196. Silver, supra note 1, at 427.
197. Wehrwein, supra note 165.
198. Finkel, supra note 32, at 249.
199. Id.
200. The “David Cash case” resulted in three hundred newspaper articles nationwide. Susan
B. Apel, Privacy in Genetic Testing: Why Women Are Different, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 14
n.67; see also, e.g., Op-Ed, America’s Shame, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 1, 1983 (“Americans reacted
with understandable outrage recently when bystanders in a New Bedford bar acted as callous
spectators to the crime of rape. We are now learning that American officials acted as accessories
after the fact in aiding Nazis who took part in the slaughter of millions of innocent people. No
moral outrage is commensurate with that crime.”).
201. Alan Dershowitz, who was quoted as the calmer voice of reason about the
technicalities of expanding a duty in the wake of the New Bedford spectator rape case,
recognized this pattern by noting: “We don’t want to make it a crime for someone to refuse to
endanger his own life. . . . Law is often the product of the worst abuses in human nature.”
Youngblood, supra note 165. The legend of the Kitty Genovese incident may also stand as an
example of the potential for a particularly emotional reaction to an event to influence the
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More measured thought would recognize that simply because
one person fails to act morally in a particular instance does not mean
that society as a whole would benefit from a change in the law
requiring moral action. Instead, the social barometer function of
heroes works just as well when society reacts to one who fails to act
heroically, and a high degree of public outrage may indicate that the
law that would prohibit the outrage-inducing conduct is not as
necessary as it would seem. As one commentator noted in the
aftermath of the Sherrice Iverson incident, “[t]he fact that the moral
outrage is so deafening is an encouraging sign that the nation’s moral
compass still works. That Mr. Cash isn’t being prosecuted means the
202
justice system hasn’t gone haywire either.”
In addition to the potential of reactionary laws to overlook their
ramifications upon heroic action and to incorrectly assume a general
lack of moral good-doing based upon a single example, the impact of
such legislation is also, in a practical sense, limited once passed.
203
Actors are rarely—if ever—prosecuted under such statutes, a fact
204
that may owe to the difficulty in tracing transgressors, particularly
given the potential hesitancy on the part of eyewitnesses to be
prosecuted for the same crime. Regardless of the reason for the lack
of enforcement, putting these laws on the books threatens heroes by
officially condoning a legal definition of the reasonable man that
confuses the social meaning of heroes. This remains true regardless of
the degree to which the laws are enforced. Should these young
statutes serve as templates for future legislation by other states, this
concern only multiplies. And given the potential political backlash of
repeal, it will be difficult to reverse rash legislation in the future as
well.
On a more philosophical level, efforts to increase a duty to
rescue are a reminder that “as the Cowardly Lion learned in Oz,
courage is not something one person can give another or a legislature

relating of that event. See Jim Rasenberger, Kitty, 40 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, § 14,
at 1 (“Yeah, there was a murder. . . . Yeah, people heard something. You can question how a
few people behaved. But this wasn’t 38 people watching a woman be slaughtered for 35 minutes
and saying, ‘Oh, I don’t want to be involved.’” (quoting one who researched the incident forty
years later)).
202. Editorial, ‘Good Samaritan’: Reaction Shows Public Is Not Indifferent, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 4, 1998, at 30A.
203. See Benac, supra note 16.
204. Silver, supra note 1, at 433 (noting that “nonrescuers would be difficult to trace, and
nearly impossible when not witnessed by others”).
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205

can pass for its constituents.” But in much the same way that it is
irrelevant whether Saul Guerrero might have been prosecuted under
these statutes had he failed to render the assistance that he did, it is
also irrelevant in relation to the argument about the value of heroes
whether these statutory efforts fail to bestow Oz-like power (or
whether that is even their intent). In both cases, this legislation
remains dangerous because it begins to unravel social and legal
understandings of heroes that provide real value in both the social
and legal contexts.
It is for these reasons that proponents are oversimplifying the
problem when they insist that expanding the duty to include easy
rescue would leave the realm of heroes intact because “[a]ctions that
206
are beyond the call of duty will not be legally required in any case.”
An examination of statutes that have already expanded the duty
reveals that virtually any amount of legislation on the subject of
rescue automatically invites questions about the realm of heroes. This
is true even when bystanders are asked to perform relatively small
tasks—such as enlisting emergency aid—because society considers
even this action to be “heroic,” a term that flies in the face of statutes
that claim to demand only “reasonable assistance.” As for cases in
which those statutes do not specify such an example of “reasonable
assistance,” the impact upon heroes is even more uncertain. And
because these statutes likely make incorrect assumptions about the
need for moralist legislation and its actual ability to change behavior,
they likely counter—or at least cause further confusion about—what
should be and can be expected of the reasonable man.
That many of these statutes have origins in reactions to
sensational (and perhaps sensationalized) single instances of
bystander cruelty may explain why their enactors have failed to fully
appreciate these and other ramifications. Proponents of expanding
the duty who insist so early in the jurisprudence that the law will
never head in the extreme direction of requiring unreasonable rescue
forget that reason’s counterpart—emotion—has largely dictated the
jurisprudence so far. In short, the assumption that the law will always
be reasonable not only seems subject to suspicion based on past facts,

205. Timothy Harper, Duty to Help, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Ky.), Mar. 11, 1984, at
A2. Andrew Carnegie seems to have agreed with this assessment. About establishing monies for
heroes, he noted, “I do not expect to stimulate or create heroism by this fund, knowing well that
heroic action is impulsive.” Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, supra note 54.
206. Adler, supra note 1, at 918.
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but is also dangerous for the future. If the assumption is true, then
dismissing the discussion of ramifications to heroes only shortchanges
a full consideration of what reasonable means. If it is false, then
society remains unprepared for, and consequently more vulnerable
to, a shift that does, in fact, require unequivocally unreasonable
conduct.
CONCLUSION
Heroic action loses its moral force when it is required by law.
Critical literature, however, has focused not on the consequences of
this loss, but on two competing social forces, which have thus far
shaped the question of whether the law should impose a duty to
rescue another. The first—an autonomist perspective—finds its roots
in classic historical cases that uphold a freedom from obligation to aid
at the expense of a victim whose harm was easily preventable. The
second and more recent utilitarian-based perspective upholds the
benefits of rescue at the expense of individual autonomy in easy
rescue scenarios, a movement that has evolved through the
Restatement, case law, and Good Samaritan statutes. Much has been
written about this trade-off and the kind of society that elects one
over the other. But this exploration has focused primarily on the pros
and cons of the choice with respect to those particular values—the
value of liberty and the value of rescue, broadly speaking—without
an examination of other kinds of social values inherent and affected
by such a choice. Although heroes provide social meaning and legal
clarity in a way that is important to both autonomists and utilitarians,
their importance does not fit cleanly into either camp.
An examination of the value of the rescuer as hero is a crucial
missing piece in the ongoing duty-to-rescue dialogue. Heroes are
treasured on a social level for reasons that are familiar—they inspire
hope and incite other good-doing, and are cause for public
celebration in many varied forms. In turn, heroes reflect upon the
society in which they live. Heroes do good deeds and, in the duty-torescue context, can even save lives. The significance of heroes on a
legal level is perhaps less readily apparent but nonetheless just as
crucial—they illuminate the meaning of reasonable conduct by
demonstrating what reasonable is not: heroic. And they do this by
existing on a plane that is separate from that of ordinary men.
Expanding the duty to rescue in the hero context confuses the
meaning of the word by merging—even if only a bit—those two
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planes, consequently changing and ultimately damaging the social and
legal values the concept provides. The recent enactment of state
statutes creating affirmative duties to rescue—despite their narrow
drafting—reflects further problems with an increased duty that does
not parallel what society deems reasonable and attempts to demand
“reasonable assistance” that society may call “heroic.” Such statutes
tend to work from pessimistic assumptions about society’s general
moral sensibilities that are probably false, and—if true—do not
realistically reflect the capacity of moral legislation to change action.
The debate over whether to require more rescue would benefit
from further discussion about the various meanings of rescue to a
society that celebrates those who perform them. In any case,
expanding the duty, at the very least, blurs a line between reasonable
and heroic conduct that is valuable when steadily drawn. And instead
of creating more heroes—as proponents of an expanding duty might
expect—requiring action further along the moral continuum only
muddles the continuum itself, leaving society with heroes that mean
less and laws that are unlikely to create more.

